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CASE NOTES
make close calculations, or try to slip by on chance; it must give way to
the vehicle on the right when it is anywhere near the crossing. 15
Relying upon Moran v. Gatz,16 Burns v. Jackson,17 and Waterbury v.
Chicago, M. and St. P. Ry. Co.,'8 the court held that where a modified
construction has been placed upon the statute by courts of review, the in-
struction should be framed according to that construction and the jury
properly instructed as to its legal effect. In Burns v. Jackson,'9 the court,
citing the Waterbury case, held:
While numerous authorities uphold the practice of giving instructions con-
taining the very language of the statute, yet we think'that where a modified
construction has already been placed thereon by our Supreme Court,... the in-
struction should be framed accordingly, otherwise it would be apt to mislead
the jury.
However, the Supreme Court of Illinois has never granted certiorari to
review the decisions of the appellate courts where it was held reversible
error to charge the jury in the words of the right-of-way statute without
qualification. Nevertheless, decisions of the appellate courts should come
within the rule set out in the Waterbury case, and modifying constructions
having been placed upon statutes by appellate courts, the lower courts
should frame their instructions accordingly.
All of the cases which apply this rule seem to involve some section of
the Motor Vehicle Act. In analyzing these statutes, particularly the right-
of-way statute, the legislature seems to have indicated an intention merely
to set up a guide rather than a hard and fast rule, leaving it to the courts
to properly qualify the statute in any instruction to the jury.
This principle that an instruction to the jury given in the words of the
statute is reversible error unless qualified does not seem to have any appli-
cation to other types of statutes than those already discussed.
PROCEDURE-IMPOSITION OF FEDERAL PRACTICE
ON STATE COURTS
Petitioner, employee of defendant railroad, was seriously injured when
an engine in which he was riding jumped the track. He claimed his injuries
were due to the defendant's negligence and brought an action in an Ohio
court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.' Defendant claimed that
petitioner had signed a release; petitioner alleged that the release was ob-
tained by fraud.
15 Shuman v. Hall, 246 N.Y. 51, i58 N.E. x6 (1927).
'a 327 Il. App. 48o, 64 N.E. 2d 564 (946).
17 22 4 1. App.s 19 (1922). 1 207 III. App. 375 ('917).
19 a24 !1l. App. 519, 528 (1922).
1 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (195).
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Though the jury found for the petitioner, the trial judge later entered
judgment non obstante veredicto. This decision was affirmed by the Ohio
Suprcme court.-' On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the Ohio Supreme Court's decision and remanded the case. The
majority opinion held: ( i ) that the validity of the release was to be deter-
mined by federal law and not Ohio law; and (2) that the issue of fraud
was to be determined by the jury and not by the judge as was the practice
in Ohio. Four judges concurred in the result but dissented from the view
as to the determination of the issue of fraud. Dice v. Akron, Canton and
Youngstown R. Co., 72 S. Ct. 312 (1952).
The rights which the Federal Employers' Liability Act creates are gov-
erned by federal rather than local rules of law.3 The validity of a release
executed by a railroad employee, covered by the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, is therefore controlled by federal law.4
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution says: "In
suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law." 5 The majority of the
Court in the Dice case held that the right to a trial by jury is a basic and
fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence, and that it is
part and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers under the Em-
plovers' Liability Act. The reason given by the Court was first used in
Jacob v. New York City,7 which originated in a federal court where it
would be conceded that the Seventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution is applicable. The majority of the Court then went on to say
that the right to trial by jury is too substantial a part of the rights accorded
by the Federal Employers' Liability Act to permit it to be classified as a
mere local rule of procedure. The Court cited Brown v. Western R. Co. of
Alabamas wherein it was held that, "Strict local rules of pleading cannot
be used to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized
by federal laws."The concurring judges, in dissenting from the view that the issue of
fraud in obtaining this release is to be determined by the jury rather than
the judge, relied on the case of Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co. v.
2 155 Ohio St. 185, 98 N.E. 2d 301 (195).
3 Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry. Inc., 319 U.S. 350 (1943); Chesapeake and Ohio Ry.
Co. v. Kuhn, 284 U.S. 44 (1931); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492
(1914); Mondou v. New York, N.H. and H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
4 Thompson v. Camp, 163 F. 2d j96 (C.A. 6th, 1947), cert..denied 335 U.S. 8z 4
(1948).
5 U.S. Const., Amend. 7.
(Dice v. Akron, Canton and Youngstown R. Co., 72 S. Ct. 312 (1952).
7 315 U.S. 752 (1942). " 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
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Bombolis,9 which they felt the majority should have overruled explicitly,
since the reasoning in that case is meaningless in view of the majority
opinion in the instant case. In the Bombolis case, it was said, after holding
that the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution was not
applicable to the states:
... it is conceded that rights conferred by Congrcss, as in this case, may be
enforced in state courts; but it is said this can only be provided such courts, in
enforcing the Federal right, are to be treated as Federal courts and be sub-
jected pro bac vice to the limitations of the Seventh Amendment. And, of
course, if this principle were well founded, the converse would also be the case,
and both Federal and state courts would, by fluctuating hybridization, be
bereft of all real, independent existence. That is to say, whether they should be
considered as state or as Federal courts would from day to day depend not
upon the character and source of the authority with which they were endowed
by the government creating them, but upon the mere subject-matter of the
controversy which they were considering. 10
There are numerous cases holding that the Seventh Amendment of the
United States Constitution, guaranteeing the right to a jury trial in civil
cases, applies only to proceedings in the federal courts;' and that the
amendment is not made applicable to the state courts by either the privi-
leges or immunities clause12 or the due process clause1 3 of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The right to trial by jury
is not in all cases essential to due process of law."
4
Ohio, like many of her sister states, retains the division of law and
equity, and where it is claimed that a release was induced by fraud (other
than fraud in the factum) or by mistake, before the cause of action which
the release purports to bar can be brought, equitable relief from the release
must first be secured.' 5 Consequently, in Ohio the judge and not the jury
is the trier of fact on this issue of fraud.
"There is nothing, however, in the Constitution of the United States or
its Amendments that requires a State to maintain the line with which we
9241 U.S. 211 (1916). This action was brought under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Minnesota law whereby five-
sixths of the jury is sufficient for a verdict in a negligence case.
10 Minneapolis and St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, zz2 (1916).
11 Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 (1877); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875);
Edwards v. Elliot, 2i Wall. (U.S.) 532 0874); The Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. (U.S.)
274 0869); Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. (U.S.) 469 (1833); Ashley v. Wait, 228 Mass.
63, 1i6 N.E. 96i (1917), writ of error dismissed 250 U.S. 652 (1919).
1 2 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 0875).
18 Ashley v. Wait, 228 Mass. 63, 116 N.E. 96t (1917), writ of error dismissed zo
U.S. 652 (19).
14 Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining and Milling Co., 152 U.S. i6o 0894); Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken L. and I. Co., 18 How. (U.S) 272 (1855).
15 45 Am. Jur., Release S 52 (1943).
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are familiar between the functions of the jury and those of the Court. It
may do away with the jury altogether, modify its constitution, the re-
quirements of a verdict, or the procedure before it."16
It is difficult to understand why Ohio should be denied the right to
demand that equitable relief first be obtained from a release obtained by
fraud before the cause of action may be brought, in view of the fact
that the federal courts still retain the division of law and equity. It is well
settled that on the equity side of the federal courts there is no right to a
trial by jury. 17
LEGISLATION-SPECIAL STATUTES WITH
CLASSIFICATION BY POPULATION
John Gaca, a Chicago policeman, brought an action against the City of
Chicago for recovery of a $2300 judgment obtained against him for a false
arrest. He recovered under section i-1 5, chapter z4, of the Illinois Re-
vised Statutes which provides that in municipalities with a population
of 500,000 or more, policemen shall be indemnified for judgments
recovered against them by reason of non-wilful torts committed while on
duty. His recovery was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. Gaca v.
City of Chicago, 411 Il1. 146, 103 N.E. zd 617 (1952).
Defendant, the City of Chicago, claimed that this statute contravenes
Section 22 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution, prohibiting special
statutes granting any special or exclusive privileges, and that it imposes a
tax upon a municipal corporation for corporation purposes, thereby vio-
lating Section 1o of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution.
The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the statute in spite of a strong dis-
sent. The court said that the classification was reasonable since policemen
in municipalities with populations over 5oo,ooo are fraught with problems
that are not found in the rest of the state. The second argument of the
defendant did not merit an answer.
Municipalities were not liable at common law for the negligent acts of
policemen in the performance of their duties.' Policemen have been indi-
vidually liable notwithstanding that the tort was committed while on
duty. 2
Although the Illinois Constitution prohibits laws granting special privi-
leges and immunities,8 the courts have seen fit to allow a leeway from the
16 Chicago, R.I. and P.R. Co. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54 (919).
17 Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. (U.S.) 433 (1830). See also, Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S.
474 (1934); Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank, 260 U.S. 235 (1922).
I Evans v. City of Kankakee, 231 I11. 223, 83 N.E. 223 (19o7).
2 City of Chicago v. Williams, r8z Ill. 135, 55 N.E. 123 (1899); Wisher v. City of
Centralia, 273 I11. App. 168 (1933).
1 I11. Const. Art. 4, k 22.
